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BOOK REVIEW SYMPOSIUM
Foreword: Revisioning the Constellations of
Critical Race Theory, Law and Economics,
and Empirical Scholarship
Clark Freshman*
PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?

GENDER DISCRIMINATION.

UNCONVENTIONAL

EVIDENCE

OF RACE

AND

By Ian Ayres.** Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 2001. 433 pp. + xi.
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY. Edited
by Francisco Valdes,t Jerome McCristal CulpT & Angela P. Harris.§
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002. 414 pp. + xxi.

The individual reviews that follow speak largely for themselves, but the
concept of this Symposium may seem to demand some brief explanation.
Partly the explanation that follows explains how the Symposium evolved, and
partly it offers one perspective on some lessons from the Symposium.
It's hard to say exactly where the idea for pairing the latest critical race
theory (CRT) collection and Ian Ayres's collection of empirical studies of
inequality first began. In some ways, it springs from a simple feeling and
intuition: These are good books by good people about an important topic, so
what might connect them? As I posed this question to many fellow scholars
and teachers, new motivations arose as well. Many people were rather shocked
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to Mitu Gulati
and Devon Carbado for their helpful comments and questions-many of which I have only
been able to answer partially. I am also especially grateful to the Stanford Law Review for

its enthusiastic embrace of this Symposium and for precise and thoughtful editing. Many
thanks to Barbara Cuadra and Sue Ann Campbell, for lightning-fast, cheerful, and
resourceful help in the library; Ari Tenzer and Enza Boderone for thoughtful and reliable
research assistance; and Beth Hanson and Felicia Martin, for administrative assistance-and
very welcome encouragement-of every sort.
** Townsend Professor, Yale Law School.
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
$ Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
§ Professor of Law, University of California-Berkeley School of Law.
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that one could even try to pair the two works. Some could see one book only as
law and economics, the other as CRT, and the two movements as somehow
inherently and profoundly antagonistic. Given the tenor of published criticism
of both, this reaction is easy enough to understand.
It's also easy enough to understand given the experiences I have had since
I first began law school. As a student, my small section at Stanford had as
professors both Patricia Williams, often thought of as one of the founders of
CRT, and Mark Kelman, who often applied law and economics principles with
a critical legal studies twist. Our section soon seemed as divided as Northern
and Southern California: Many of us loved one, and had far less fuzzy feelings
about the other. And yet some of us, including myself, found ourselves
fascinated by both-much as some of us grew to love all of California.
So, too, since I left law school, I came to better know how the other
contributors to this Symposium also found themselves drawn to practices and
works that others habitually saw as different, and often antagonistic, schools of
thought. In the case of Kevin Haynes, that has meant many years of
transactional lawyering practice, years of graduate training in American
literature and literary theory, and, when we were both at Stanford, editing the
huge Stanford symposium on women of color and the law. For Rachel Moran,
this has meant applying law and economics in her teaching, exploring her
experiences as one of the only women of color at Boalt Law School (and the
University of California at Berkeley generally), and enriching her scholarship
with insights from psychology, economics, and literature. 1 For Mary Anne
Case, among many other things, this has meant showing the sometimes ironic
links between Richard Epstein, often invoked as an exemplar of one brand of
law and economics, and feminism.
The venues for the Symposium reflected quite deliberate choices. The live
version of the Symposium took place at the annual Law and Society meeting.
Partly this reflects an appreciation of the good aspects of that meeting and
association: It draws together those interested in law and society, be they from
law schools or other schools, be they trained in law or in one of many other
disciplines. And partly the choice reflected an idea of a level playing field.
Both CRT and law and economics have their own regular home bases and
meetings. Law and society was a kind of neutral ground. It was also an event
1. A confession:

1 also thought of Rachel and Kevin because they are friends with

whom I'd worked before-I was a member of the Stanford Law Review when Kevin was
Managing Editor, and I was Rachel Moran's research assistant when she visited at Stanford
and was doing early research on what became a book on interracial intimacy. This seems
like something of a confession because my own contribution to this Symposium, as well as
my work elsewhere, suggests that our automatic preferences for those we like may tend
towards those like ourselves, thereby disadvantaging many various outsiders. I take some
comfort from the knowledge that the three of us represent three different ethnicities (white,
Latina, and African American), different sexual orientations, and different religions. Also, at
least one of us might qualify as disabled, and at least one of us grew up other than in the
middle class.
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that would find in the same meeting people who might rarely go to the same
meetings. Finally, it also represented a way to bring law and economics and
CRT back to Law and Society when many within Law and Society found both
suspicious!
The Stanford Law Review seemed like a natural home as well. Where
other law reviews often seemed more readily linked to this or that perspective,
the Stanford Law Review has a history of taking many kinds of scholarship
seriously. One past symposium brought together women of color and the law,
and many volumes have included both important works associated with CRT
and those associated with law and economics.
While the history of putting on this Symposium came to make this look
like an exploration in conducive atmospheres, it took some time to figure out
what we would find during the exploration. Many of the discoveries remain in
the following individual reviews. And partly the reviews, like the books
themselves, tell a similar story.
Both the books themselves, and the reviews here, can be seen as
constellations in many ways. In many ways constellations have value. They
let us see patterns that might seem otherwise undetectable. So, too, they give
us some reference point for change-what's going on near that constellation?
We know the schools of our scholars, and we wonder how they evolve. Both
books themselves partake of this kind of familiar pattern: the CRT most
obviously in the "crossroads" in its title; the Ayres collection more traditionally
in its final chapter on new directions in empirical research. Just as astronomers
may make much of discovering some new planet or moon in a system, many
may find some delight in discovering how each volume speaks of its new
contributions to what previously looked like established systems. Some law
and economics followers may see new satellites of research in the new methods
for testing for discrimination, and many critical scholars of various strands will
recognize new attention to sometimes neglected areas of difference (e.g.,
people with disabilities and Native Americans) and sometimes relatively
neglected areas of analysis (like international development).
At the same time, the constellations can be limiting as well. We "see" a
constellation, and we forget how some once saw other patterns. 2 It is all too
easy to speak of CRT and law and economics or empirical scholarship as if
they were neat, natural categories. We may see some patterns so clearly that
we do not see differences within. What are the different stars in the big
dipper? 3 How are some of those stars like stars in other constellations? It's
easy to forget that many scholars thought of as towering figures of CRT, like

2. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, INSIGHT MEDITATION: THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM 112 (1994)
(describing how the concept of the Big Dipper may also be "useful because it helps us to
recognize the constellation" but the concept also "separate[s] out those stars from all the
rest. . . and we lose sight of the night sky's wholeness").

3. Id.
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Williams, did not use the term to describe themselves, or how even an editor of
the volume, Frank Valdes, struggled to deal with the homophobia he felt within
CRT.
Constellations may also limit us by their focus on stars. We may focus so
much on the stars that we do not notice other features of the sky. 4 And we may
so "naturally" sort leading scholars like Ayres and Williams into certain
categories that we do not give enough thought to the categories themselves.
This may also distort the way we view approaches because we may easily take
the way one star criticizes another star as if there were some inherent tension
between whole constellations or schools of thought. Most notably, the often
suspicious and even shrill assaults by law and economics guru Richard Posner
on some figures in CRT may lead many to see some inherent and profound
antagonism between law and economics and CRT.
We also overlook other potential patterns. Much like campers who become
mesmerized by one constellation, legal audiences may read only one type of
scholarship, never learning what others may teach. Take the example of
intersectionality.
Many might look and look at different concepts of
intersectionality in CRT and learn much. Alas, many who think about
intersectionality might not approach a work like Ayres's because it seems so
thoroughly part of law and economics or, as Haynes's contribution to this
Symposium suggests, so thoroughly quantitative. 5 And yet Ayres makes a
compelling and elegant case for intersectionality-even as his response in this
Symposium suggests explorations of other intersections that may raise
methodological and political dangers. 6 His quantitative analysis shows African
American men and women may really face quite different treatment.
More generally, it is important to note how both Ayres and the CRT editors
recognize that their methods complement each other. As the CRT editors note
in their response, and as Case and I emphasize in our own pieces: "The two
methods work best in tandem to capture glimpses of social reality missed by
the limits of each other," and "the two mutually confirm the virulence of the
historic and ongoing epidemic" of discrimination. 7 Ayres's statistical analyses
carefully showed how older rules on kidney transplants had the effect of
keeping African Americans waiting years longer than whites for a kidney.
Still, Ayres notes in his own response how "Jerome Culp's powerful discussion
of his own experience attempting to qualify for a ...transplant brought home
to me in a very personal way the continuing value of... [CRT] narrative." 8

4. Id.
5. Kevin Haynes, Taking Measures, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2349, 2353-54 (2003).
6. Ian Ayres, Is DiscriminationElusive?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2419, 2423-24 (2003).

7. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Angela P. Harris & Francisco Valdes, Subject Unrest, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 2435, 2449 (2003).
8. Ayres, supra note 6, at 2432.
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And yet what follows is not a simple love fest. Real controversies remain.
At the methodological level, Ayres calls for far more tests for discrimination
involving variations on his own careful quantitative testing-and testing
reflecting quantitative tests from other disciplines like psychology, sociology,
and political science. 9 The CRT editors worry such calls for proof are
"luxur[ies]" and that those themselves subject to subordination often find
themselves "doubted by others" in their claims of unfaimess. 10 At the policy
level, Ayres considers reforms that might shock many of his law and
economics colleagues: allowing the mere showing of different results for
groups as a whole to establish liability; letting computer-generated tests of
unconscious discrimination impeach witness credibility; and requiring auto
dealers to disclose far more information on pricing practices to consumers.
And yet it still falls far short of the CRT editors' call in their Article for
"structural and social transformation" and "no less than the establishment of
substantive security and social dignity for all."'
More follows. The reviews below explore different ways to view the
constellations that make these two books-as well as the wider systems that
may contain them. They also mark what I hope will be a starting point for
other explorations as well, ones that build on some of the connections and
reconstructions we offer and that spin their own.

9. Id.

10. Culp et al., supra note 7, at 2444.
11. Culp et al., supra note 7, at 2452. As I suggest in my review below, overly abstact
generalizations about "the market," like abstractions about "individual" versus "institutional"
versus "social" reform, may both exaggerate and obscure debate. It often may clarify
discussion to instead focus on more particular arguments and proposals. See Clark
Freshman, PreventionPerspectives on "Different" Kinds of Discrimination:From Attacking
Different "Isms" to Promoting Acceptance in Critical Race Theory, Law and Economics,

and EmpricialResearch, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2293, 2343 n.235 (2003).

